translated by mihaela militaru & irina ionescu |
When trying to explain the verbal or non-verbal way of expression called “metadiscourse”, we realized our confusions were bigger than we would have expected. Thus, besides that the very term is too vague for us, we are also faced with the difficulty of understanding the contribution of prefix “meta-” when added to any term. However, the latter confusion appears as the first obstacle to be removed when searching the meaning of a “metaterm” as the “metadiscourse”. The present essay is an attempt to remove this obstacle. Therefore, we ask the question: does prefix “meta-” has a particular meaning? Moreover, if the answer were yes, which would it be?Our hypothesis and the answer we are trying to give is that prefix “meta-” means an attempt “to exhaust”, through the mind’s total comprehension of the field (discipline) designated by the term which follows the prefix. By “exhausting” we mean putting together all ways of thinking practiced by the field concerned, through a theory on its nature and status.
meta-
“I don’t know about the others but as far as I am concerned” every time I run into a term proceeded by “meta-”, I automatically associate it with the word metaphysics. The story of this term is well known by those involved in philosophical matters and not only. It is encountered at Aristotle through the seeming contribution of an ancient editor of Stagirus. By metaphysics, he understood a corpus of texts subsequent, in the order of editing, to another corpus called Physics. Therefore, the current meaning does no longer correspond to the original one though, the ancient collection referred to issues which might be included into what we presently call metaphysical texts. However, we must bear in mind the fact that meta-‘s original meaning was “subsequently “or “after” and then, it turned into what it is today.The terms “meta-ethics” and “meta-language” can attest the shift in its meaning. These two terms are modern inventions and therefore they can illustrate nothing but the current meaning of prefix “meta-”; however, they have the dignity of illustrating just the meaning we are looking for. Thus, the term “meta-ethics”, although not frequently used in the theoretical studies on ethics, when used, refers to “meditation on the status of moral thinking “as to differentiate it from ”practical ethics and the construction of moral theories” . Therefore, we might draw a first impression – meta-ethics speaks about ethics. Moreover, it does not just speak about it but it aims to display a theory on the meaning of “ethics”. As, what else is that meditation “on the status of moral thinking” if not an attempt to theorize within the limits of ethics. In other words, meta-ethics speaks about the background, the basis for the field of ethics which studies the issues of the ethical thought – or, what else is a background if not an “after”, a support placed under the object concerned (ethics in our case). Although this “after” has a different meaning from the “after” envisaged by Aristotle’s editor (and which is the term’s understanding at the level of common sense) it is however an extension of the original meaning.
The case of the term meta-language is equally revealing. It is used to designate a language that speaks about another language . Naturally, in this case too, we don’t deal with a random “speaking about” as it results from A.Flew’s article; it is an attempt of putting the meanings of the object language into a theory. It seems that we are again witnessing the tendency of finding a basis for investigating (in our case, investigating the object language), an “after” that should support the research effort because the theory on object language meaning is precisely such a tendency.
However, let’s go back to metaphysics, as this term is the best support for revealing the meanings of prefix meta-. We already mentioned the old meaning of metaphysics, at the time when metaphysics was practically an indication of order. The meaning changed afterwards and for the post-Aristotelian philosophers Metaphysics would speak about Physics. ”The speaking about” was achieved through a theory on the meanings of Physics, which is nothing but a theory with Physics as its object.
We will hitherto call the terms prefixed by meta- as metaterms (for example metaethics, metalanguage and metaphysics), and the objects they are related to (as it was the case with ethics, language and physics) will be called object- terms.
In conclusion, we notice that every time prefix meta- was added to an object-term, it produced a double shift: firstly, it determined reference to the object-term concerned (“the speaking about”); secondly, it produced an apparent all comprehensive meditation on the object-term’ meaning and on the field it determined (where this theory is viewed as a background, as the object’s support–like that “after” object which the metaterm struggles to reflect). However, the two above-mentioned shifts are just the steps of the same road: when asked about the “something” added by prefix “meta-” we’ll answer that it is the meditation road “beyond” (“after”) the object–term, with the aim of determining the most proper meanings of the object–term and its subordinate field.
metaterms
We have stated that the substantial meaning of the particle-prefix meta (its what) is the ”excursion” of thought towards the determination of the most appropriate meanings of the object-term and its subordinate field (where the object-term is the word preceded by the concerned prefix). Starting from this premise, any metaterm seems to acquire another dignity, besides that of a simple reference to a term, as it would be suggested by the modalities in which metaterms were understood. Metaphysics is more than a reference to Physics; Metaethics is more than a reference to Ethics and Metalanguage is more than a reference to Language. Therefore, it is obvious that Metadiscourse is more than a reference to Discourse.
What difference does a metaterm make? And what is then the meaning of the term “metadiscourse”?
metaterms and their basis
The answer to this question is to be found investigating the very conditions that determined the invention of metaterms. If we consider the case of Metaphysics and Metaethics:1. For a thinker these two terms represent an advantage because they refer to knowledge and not to its objects; they do not say anything directly about the latter, thus, eluding the reality constraint imposed by the correspondence truth or by the other types of theories on truth (verifying, coherent, pragmatic).
2. They represent bodies of knowledge about knowledge and their activity takes place at this rarefied level of thought about thought – these metaterms are manifestations of thought which returns upon itself (reflection) in order to harmonize with the laws of the Intellect (Logic) and the Ideas of Reason. The presumption here is that the thought represents a special territory, articulated by its own laws that function independently of facts.
These two reasons alone would be enough for us to understand the fact that at the basis of metaterms is the will of naming, exploring or even articulating within a system some examined dimensions, not directly connected to facts. Hence, it results that the arguments referring to metaterms cannot be empirically founded on facts; but only on the laws of the intellect and the ideas of reason. Therefore metaterms cannot be either true or verified, but validated, as a result of producing some valid reasoning, or apodictically (axiomatically, pragmatically, hypothetically) assumed.
Thus, the basis of a metaterm is imponderable, because virtual. When we say metaterm we think of the field it refers to and not only to the name (because its basis is not a question of the most appropriate name); namely we think that a metaterm is legitimately invented and used when it stands for a construction of thought about thought.
metadiscourse and accompanying discourse
Not different seems to be the case of the above–mentioned metaterm. By metadiscourse is usually meant a discourse about discourse. Which is not satisfactory because we are dealing with a discourse with founding claims regarding the object–discourse; it is observed the substantiation of the object discourse from the chosen point of view.Reaching this point we can be accused that the terms “foundation”, ”substantiation” are too vague, because they can mean anything. But the sense in which we use them is the current one in the classical theory of knowledge: supplying a basis which derives from true premises or is indeed a true opinion acknowledged as such.
However, the accompanying discourse is a species distinct from metadiscourse. Unlike the latter, it does not attempt to found, but to describe, to persuade the audience. It is less interested in true premises and valid reasoning; its interest lies in the intended effect on “the target group”. Here is to be seen a persuasive measure with a mobilizing or at least active effect.
Finally, we believe that the difference between metadiscourse and accompanying discourse is analogous to that between political philosophy and ideology. The stakes of the two undergo differences and similarities hard to be estimated; the separating boundary is almost impossible to be drawn. Despite this fact, it is difficult to associate metadiscourse with a persuasive purpose or with a non-theoretical one. It is restricted in the territory of a theory founder discourse, not general but limited within a discourse field or a discourse problem.
What is the contribution, the ineffable brought by a metaterm, besides what derives from the meta-particle and the object-term? Its contribution seems to be the will of rational foundation of any action in the reflection domain by means of reflection (thought through thought); passing beyond or on the other side of (“after”) the object-term one looks for its foundations. Afterwards, returning to the metaterm, thought becomes able to justify it completely (synthesis).
In other words, the metaterm is the repeated story of the adventures of thought in the “land” of the object-term, story that we would never hear about unless thought returned to itself.
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